From research to regulation

Lloyd’s Register brings alarm management strategies to the IMO

At the IMO’s 12th session of the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC 12) in January, alarm management stepped into the spotlight as a priority issue. When Asger Christian Schliemann Haug, lead data scientist at Lloyd’s Register’s technical directorate, presented his latest research findings to the IMO delegates, it was a moment that brought years of investigation, lived experience and growing industry concern into a single, focused discussion.

For Haug, IMO SDC 12 marked a significant milestone. “When I took on the Alarm Management project back in 2023, we believed it had the potential to significantly improve maritime safety and crew wellbeing,” he says. “But we also knew that nothing would change unless everyone was willing to engage with it.”

Haug’s research took a critical approach: first investigating if there was a challenge (Vol 1), then potential improvements for existing ships (Vol 2) and also for new ships (upcoming Vol 3).

That sense of shared responsibility has been central to the work from the beginning. And at SDC 12, there was a clear sense that the industry is starting to align around the issue. The issue gained new visibility and urgency at the IMO level after being formally raised, in part by the Norwegian Maritime Authority, following recommendations from the Viking Sky investigation.

From analysis to international attention
The work traces back to recommendations for the management of cargo alarm systems issued by the Society of International Gas Tankers and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), which highlighted a clear disparity between maritime practices and the more mature alarm management frameworks used in shore-based industries.

“Looking into this early on, it was quickly clear that there was quite a lot to learn from our neighbouring industries,” Haug explains. “That’s when it became clear this wasn’t just a small improvement exercise to see whether our rules could align better. It was something more fundamental.”

To understand the scale of the problem, Haug and his team collected data from vessels, spoke face-to-face with seafarers and analysed more than 40 million events from the alarm logs on ships. What emerged was a consistent picture across ship types and operating profiles. During events, alarm systems often produce so many alarms that this exceeds what a human operator can reasonably process. In those moments, discrimination as to what is important becomes difficult, if not impossible, trust in the system reduces, and decision-making suffers. The results confirmed what many at sea had long reported: alarm systems frequently overwhelm rather than assist.

“If you hear a chief engineer say they get too many alarms to even count, and then you see 4,000 alarms in ten minutes in the data, you know they’re not exaggerating,” Haug notes. “It was important to put that human experience next to the objective evidence to provide impactful data to the industry.”

A shift in how alarms are understood
This integration of human and technical perspectives is central to the work. Haug’s expertise, through his degrees in marine engineering and data science, alongside his experience working at sea, allowed him to analyse event logs and conduct onboard studies, using his technical and analytical skills for deeper investigations.

In Haug’s view, alarm management in the maritime industry has long been misunderstood to be merely about presentation of alarms. “At its core, it is about managing the abnormal situations behind the alarms,” he explains. “Although we describe these situations as ‘abnormal’, they are still a foreseeable part of a ship’s design basis—otherwise, an alarm would not have been installed in the first place. And that’s a different way to think about it.

“An alarm is essentially a request for a human response. It’s a system’s cry for help” Haug explains. “If the alarm response isn’t feasible, because there are too many alarms, or they’re unclear, or they arrive too late, then the system isn’t supporting safety, regardless of how it looks on the paper and what colour it has.”

The urgency of addressing this issue is supported by industry-wide safety data. Maritime incident rates have remained broadly static over the past decade, with a significant proportion attributed to human error. For Haug, that statistic points to a design issue rather than a people issue.

“We need to start treating human factors like any other engineering discipline,” he says. “Because there are just as many design constraints around a human, probably more.” Haug emphasises the importance of better understanding how the engineering crew use alarms in their daily work.

Why the timing matters
The presentation at IMO SDC 12 provided member states and NGOs with a robust, evidence-based foundation for discussion. It helped move the discussion away from isolated incidents and towards a broader understanding of how alarm systems function in real operations.

“Our role isn’t to tell the industry what to do,” Haug says. “It’s to give an informed basis for the discussion on the development of a new performance standard called ECRAM (Engine Control Room Alert Management).” The response suggests that this approach is working. Several member states have already referenced LR’s research in their IMO submissions, and a correspondence group is now being established to take the work forward.

“I am confident that Anne NorderudPoulsen from the Danish Maritime Authority will be an excellent coordinator for the correspondence group,” says Haug.
For Haug, the importance of steady, collaborative leadership is fundamental to the success of the work. “If you just push solutions onto people, it doesn’t work,” he says. “It has to be an organic process where everyone is involved.”

This includes not only regulators and designers, but also manufacturers and seafarers, whose insights are critical to ensuring practical applicability of the upcoming ECRAM regulation. “In our view, the performance standard for ECRAM should be developed from the front line of ship operations, because that’s the context where it needs to work,” Haug says.

This human-centred perspective is deeply personal for Haug. Having worked at sea as a marine engineering officer, and with close family members still in seafaring roles, he remains closely connected to the realities faced by crews. “Everybody out there is someone’s family,” he says. “As safety professionals, we have a duty of care to make sure these systems actually help them do their job safely.”

Looking ahead, the next phase of the work will focus on practical guidance on how to design alarms that are genuinely useful from the outset. That means making sure alarms are actionable, timely and reasonable, while at the same time enabling front line safety professionals such as surveyors to objectively evaluate these qualities during the newbuild process — at a time when changes can still be made at minimum cost.

“There is currently a strong focus on alarm design, or rationalisation. At first, many think it is just a colouring exercise, or simply prioritisation, but once you begin, you quickly realise its real purpose is to ensure that the crew has a realistic chance to respond to the abnormal situation behind the alarm itself, thereby preventing the alarm’s consequence of concern.”

What SDC 12 has done is bring that reality into sharper focus. For Haug, that shift is both encouraging and necessary. “This is about recognising that people are part of the system,” Haug reflects. “If we design alarm systems that genuinely support the crew, especially when conditions are at their most demanding, we can make a real difference to safety at sea.

“It’s field studies like these that can really help policy makers at the IMO make informed decisions.”